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How informed flow sets the spread

Asked at Optiver, IMC

An asset's true value is either VH=110V_H = 110 or VL=90V_L = 90, each equally likely. A fraction α\alpha of the traders who arrive are informed (they know VV and always trade the profitable direction); the remaining 1α1-\alpha are noise traders who buy or sell 50/5050/50 at random. You are a competitive market maker who must post a bid and an ask before seeing who arrives.

At what ask (and bid) do you break even? Show how the spread depends on α\alpha.

Show a hint

A buy order is information. Set your ask equal to the expected value of the asset conditional on receiving a buy, that's the zero-profit price. Use Bayes' rule.

Your answer

This one is open-ended. Work it through, then check your reasoning against the full solution.

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